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XXII.
The Supreme Court of a State will take judicial notice of the
times prescribed by law for holding the terms of the various
courts in the State: Lindsayv.1 Viliams(i85O), 17 Ala. 229; Mor-
gan V. State(1859), 12 Ind.448; Sta!tev. Hammett (1847),7 Ark.
492 ; Gilliland v. Sellers (1853), 2 Ohio St. 223 ; Puglh v. State
(I858), 2 Head. (Tenn.) 227; and of who are the judges of the
inferior courts: Tucker v. State (1857), II Md. 322; Ez Pare
Peterson (I858), 33 Ala. 74; Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth (1858),
31 Pa. 198. Circuit Courts will take notice of who are justices
of the peace within the county where the court is held: Gra-
ham v. Anderson (1867), 42 Ill. 514. But not of the official
acts of a justice, offered in evidence in a county other than
where he resides: Chambers v. People (1843), 5 Ill. 351. No-
tice will be taken of the terms of court, to determine whether
an execution was levied in the lifetime of the writ: W1illiams v.
Hubbard(i85o), i Mich.446. Where the Common Pleas tried
a party for a felony, the Supreme Court took notice, from the
time the offence was committed until the trial, and the terms
of the Circuit Court, that the latter could not have been in
session so as to find an indictment: JfcGinnis v. State (1865),
24 Ind. 5oo. Territorial courts are bound to know the officers
and enforce the judgments of United States courts, within
their jurisdiction: Buford v. Hickman (834), Hemp. (U. S.
C. Ct. Ter. Ark.) 292. But, as a general rule, superior courts
will not judicially notice the customs, rules or proceedings of
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inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, unless justice requires it
in reviewing their decisions: / 1arch v. Commonwealt (185 I),
12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25. From the date, and the term of the
court below, an appellate court will take notice of whether a
judgment by default was prematurely rendered: Bethune v.
Hale (I87I), 45 Ala. 522.
From the commencement and duration of the terms of the
Circuit Court, the Supreme Court will take notice that a speci-
fied day fell in the second week of the term: Rodgcrs v. Stare
(1874), 50 Ala. 102. And in like manner, of what was "the
twentieth judicial day" of the term of the court below, next
succeeding a certain other day: Lewis v. Wintrode (1881), 76
Ind. 13.
XXIII.
All courts have official knowledge that proper judicial tri-
bunals are established in the several States; and in order to
give the transcript of the record or the probate of a will in a
sister State in evidence, it is not necessary to show that probate
and registry are required in such State: Dozier v. Joyce ( 839),
8 Por. (Ala.) 303. The seal of a State court proves itself:
DeSobry v. DeLaistre (1807), 2 H. & J. (Md.) 191; State v.
Snowdon (I868), I Brewst. (Pa.) 218. Where a deed mentions
the premises, as within a certain town, not naming the State,
the court will notice that the town named is within a certain
county in the State: Harding v. Strong(1866),42 Ill. 148. A
judgment which is enjoined, will be noticed as part of the
record in the proceedings: -Minor v. Stone (1846), I La. An.
283. So, an order of the court entered upon the minutes, is a
part of the record: Pagettv. Curtis (I86o), I 5 Id. 451.
Where there had been a reversal and a second judgment
rendered, one error assigned for its reversal was, that the cause
had not been remitted to the court below; and nothing in re-
gard to it appearing from the record sent up, it was held
that the appellate court would take judicial notice of its own
record and proceedings on the former writ of error: Brncker
v. State (I865), 19 Wis. 539.
Courts take judicial notice of all prior proceedings in a case,
hence, on a plea in bar of "once in jeopardy," the former trial
and verdict are before the court : State v. Bowen (1876), 16 Kan.
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475. The book of records of judgments, in the same court,
proves itself: Robinson v. Brown (1876), 82 Ill. 279. An appel-
late court will take notice of its own records; but, in deciding
a case, will not take notice of what may be in the record of
another case, unless made a part of the record in the case under
consideration: NVationalBank of Mionticllo v. Bryant (1877), 13
Bush (Ky.) 419.
XXIV.
In an action on a transcript of a judgment of the Circuit
Court of another State, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin took
notice that the circuit courts of the several States are courts of
general jurisdiction: Jarvis v. Robinson (1867), 21 Wis. 523.
To support the jurisdiction of the District Court, in a case
involving the claimant's right to the office ofjudge, the Supreme
Court took judicial notice that the salary of the office exceeded
one hundred dollars: .ilcKitney v. O'Cmonor (186I), 26 Tex. 5.
The Orphans' Court of Washington county, in the District
of Columbia, being created by a public statute of the United
States, its seal will be judicially recognized by the courts in
Maryland: 3angntn v. lVbster (1848), 7 Gill (Md.) 78.
XXV.
If, pending a suit against an executor for an accounting, the
will be revoked in another proceeding, the court cannot take
notice of the fact, without proof: Dani/v. Belamy (1884), 91
N. C. 78. From the records of the Chancery Court, the Su-
preme Court will know that there never was, legally, a county
of a certain name in the State: Brozen v. Elms (1849), io
Humph. (Tenn.) 135. Where a bill is filed ostensibly to pro-
tect the interests of the State, the court will take judicial no-
tice of the laws of the State, even if they contradict the alle-
gations in the bill; so held with reference to a law enabling a
particular officer to qualify: State v. Jarrett (I86I), 17 Md.
309. The court will take notice that a person, present in the
grand jury room when the charge laid in the indictment was
being investigated, was a duly authorized assistant United
States District Attorney: People v. Lyman (1877), 2 Utah 30.
The court will take notice of the expiration of a bank charter,
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and dismiss an action pending against the bank on a dormant
judgment : Terry v. Merchants' and Planters' Bank (I 88o), 66
Ga. 177.
Where it does not affirmatively appear that a statute was
put in force by publication, as allowed by law, the court will
recognize its existence and validity: People v. Hiopt (884), 3
Utah 396. Courts will take notice that a certain city is within
a particular county of the State, and proof that a crime was
committed in such city is sufficient to establish the fact that it
was perpetrated in the county: Sullivan v. People (1887), 122
Ill. 385 ; State v. Reader (1883), 6o Iowa 527; Luck v. State
(1884), 96 Ind. 16. The office of treasurer of a school dis-
trict will be recognized without proof of how it was created:
State v. Dahl (1886), 65 Wis. 5Io. Courts take judicial notice
of the signatures of their own officers as such, but no rule ex-
tends such notice to the signatures of the parties to a cause:
Aldcrson v. Bel (1858), 9 Cal. 315. Their notice of the sig-
natures of attorneys -extends only to acts done in the perform-
ance of their professional duties as attorneys, and the signa-
ture of an attorney, admitting service of summons as a de-
fendant in the suit, is a private act which the court cannot ju-
dicially notice: 11asterson v. Le Claire (i86O), 4 M inn. 163.
Where an act of the legislature, establishing a certain county,
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee, it was held that the circuit judge, in the trial of a
cause, had a right to declare to the jury his judicial knowledge
of such decision, and its effect in fixing the boundaries of
counties: Cashv. State (1849), IO Humph. (Tenn.) I I I.
Where a case is reversed and remanded by the Supreme
Court, and after proceedings had below, another appeal is
taken; and an appearance entered in the inferior court in the
first instance has never been withdrawn, the Supreme Court
will judicially know what attorneys have appeared in the
cause: Symincsv. Major (1863), 21 Ind. 443. The record in
garnishee proceedings is virtually a part of the record in the
cause and may be judicially noticed: Farrar v. Bates (188 i),
55 Tex. 193. Where the facts are within the judge's knowl-
edge, no proof is required; as on a motion to strike a paper
from the files because it was never presented to or signed by
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the judge: Scristv.Ptty (1883), io9 Ill. 188. A judge may
take judicial notice of the existence, before his court, of a
prosecution for crime against one called as a juror: State v.
Jackson (1883), 35 La. An. 769.
Where it appears from the record, that a contract was given
for contingent compensation in obtaining an act of the legisla-
ture, it is the duty of the court, of its own motion, to declare
it void, as against public policy and to discountenance any
attempt to enforce it: Gitv. IVilliams (1857), I2 La. An. 219.
XXVI.
Courts will take judicial notice of the regular course of
nature, as the revolution of the seasons in relation to vegetables
and animals: Patterson v. JPCasland (I83O), 3 Bland. (Md.)
69; of the usual course of agriculture, and whether the
-crops of the country are matured at a certain date, so as to be
removed from the soil: Floydv. Ricks (1853), 14 Ark. 286;
of facts of unvarying occurrence, but not of vicissitudes of cli-
mate or seasons: Dixon v. Niccolls (1866), 39 Ill. 372; that a
mortgage given in January on a certain cotton crop, is on a
crop not yet in being: Tomlinson v. Greenfidd (1876), 31 Ark.
557; of the seasons and husbandry, and that the use of a farm
is worth much more during the cropping season than for the
six months including winter: Ross v. Boswell (1877), 6o Ind.
235.
XXVII.
Notice will be taken from the time of their ancestor's death,
that his children had arrived at majority before the suit was
brought: Floyd v. Johnson (1822), 2 Littell (Ky.) I o9 . With
reference to a part of a ship's cargo being wet with salt water
in the river Mersey, in England, it has been judicially noticed
that the tide ebbs and flows in that stream to a great height:
Whitney v. Gauche (1856), Ii La. An. 432. Courts will take
notice of the ordinary computation of time and what day of the
week a certain day of the month falls on: Allman v. Owen
(1857), 31 Ala. 167; Sprozl v. Lawrence (859), 33 Id. 674;
Philadelphia, &c., R.R. Co. v. Lehman (I88i), 56 Md. 209; and
that a certain day falls on Sunday: McIntosh v. Lee ([881), 57
Iowa 356; and the difference of time in different latitudes:
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Curtis v. Jlharsh (1858), 4 Jur. N. S. (Lond.) III2; and of
the ordinary period of gestation: King v. Leuffe (I8O7), 8
East 193.
That distilled spirits are intoxicating: Carmon v. State (1862),
18 Ind. 450; .Egan v. State (1876), 53 Id. 162; CGmonzoa./
v. Peckhamn (1854), 2 Gray. (Mass.) 514. That whisky is an
intoxicating liquor: Schlicht v. S/ate (1877), 56 Ind. 173; that
beer is a malt liquor: Irztson v. State (1876), 55 Ala. 158 ;
State v. Goacte (1877), II R. I. 592; and that blackberry
brandy is an intoxicating liquor: Fenton v. State (1884), 100
Ind. 598. Of the navigability of streams: N'eaderhouser v.
State (1867), 28 Ind. 257; !Vroodv.Fowule)-(I882), 26 Kas. 682.
Judicial notice has been taken, as a fact for the court and not
for the jury, that a box freight car standing still at a highway
crossing, will not frighten horses of ordinary gentleness: Gil-
bertv. Flint,-c.,R.R. Co. (1883), 51 Mich. 488. In adjudicat-
ing upon surveys, courts are bound to notice the magnetic
variation from the true meridian: Bryan v. Beckley (I8O9), 6
Littell (Ky.) 9'.
XXVIII.
In an action to restrain an infringement of a patent, for pre-
serving articles of food by the application of cold air, the court
took judicial notice that the scientific principles claimed in the
patent were generally known and had been long in use in the
ice cream freezer, and held the patent was void for want of any
novelty in their application: Brown v. Piper (1875), 91 U. S.
37. Courts will take judicial notice of the art of photography,
the mechanical and chemical process employed, the scientific
principles on which they are based, and their results: Luke v.
Calhoun Co. (1875), 52 Ala. 115. On a trial for arson, it need
not be alleged or proved that coal oil is inflammable: State v.
Hayes (1883), 78 Mo. 307. It cannot be objected that an
almanac was put in evidence to show when the sun rose on a
certain day, as the court, in any event, would take judicial
notice of that fact: People v. Chee Kee (1882), 61 Cal. 404.
The courts will notice that carrying on the business of a barber
on Sunday is not work of necessity, within the statute: State
v. Frederick (1885), 45 Ark. 347. That the superintendent of
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a railroad company has authority to refuse or receive cord-
wood: Sacalaris v. Enreka & Palisade R. R. Co. (1883), 18
NeV. 155.
Of what is meant by a "gift enterprise," upon the trial of one
indicted for advertising the same: Lohman v. State (i88i), 81
Ind. 15: for, as to judicial notice of epithets, courts have no
right to be'ignorant of the meaning of current phrases which
everybody else understands; and so, in this action, which was
by a clergyman, for libel in printing certain charges concern-
ing him, while a candidate for Congress, the court took notice
of the meaning of the following words: "Then there was that
Iowa Beecher business of his, which beat him out of a station
at Grass Lake:" Baihy v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co. (879), 40
Mich. 25 .
Courts will take notice of ordinary abbreviations, such as
"admr.," for "administrator;" and of the usual abbreviation of
Christian names: Noselty v. M1astin (1861), 37 Ala. 216; Ste-
phn v. State (1852), II Ga. 225 ; If e'aerv. .fcEllenon (1850),
3 M o. 89. Where a statute prohibited the keeping of gaming
tables, excepting billiard tables, the court took judicial notice
of what a billiard table is, and that, under this statute, a party
may be punished for allowing faro to be played on it: State v.
Pr-ice (841), 12 G. & J. (Md.) 260.
XXIX.
As a matter of general notoriety, courts will take notice of
the peculiar nature of lotteries and the modes in which they are
generally managed: B8oullemet v. State (1856), 28 Ala. 83. Of
the character of the circulating medium, and the popular lan-
guage in reference to it: Lampton v. Haggard (i8z6), 3 T. B.
Mon. (Ky.), 149. As affecting the rights of parties, courts will
take notice of changes in the course of business in the country,
and of new processes of practical utility in facilitating trade:
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & A. R.R. Co. (1878), 5 Mo.App.
347; an'd it has been held in Kentucky, that the chancellor
will take notice of the prices of ordinary labor: Bell v. Barnett
(1829), .2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 516.
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XXX.
In construing an instrument granting a power, where a long
time has elapsed from the date of its execution, in order to
carry out the intention of the parties, courts will take notice
that-the language of all countries is subject to fluctuation and
change, and that certain terms, the meaning ofwhich was uni-
versally known and understood at the time they were employed,
may come to have an entirely different meaning: Vanada v.
Hop ins (1829), I-J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 285.. As the only means
of determining-the present value of a wife's inchoate right of
dower, courts will recognize the use of "annuity tables," and
adopt the "American Table of Mortality," as the standard in
this country: Goodon v. Tweedy (1883), 74 Ala. 232.
In determining whether a trustee acted with prudence in the
management of assets during war times, the courts of Alabama
take judicial notice of the disturbed condition of business dur-
ing that period : Fescue v. Lyon (1876), 55 Ala. 44o.
Courts will take notice that Free-masonry is a charitable
institution; and that, in a suit against his lodge, a member is
not, for that reason, disqualified as a juror: Burdine v. Grand
Lodge of Alabama (I861), 37 Ala. 478. The court will take
notice of the ordinary incidents of railway travel: Downey v.
Hendrie (88i), 46 Mich. 386.
XXXI.
Ther6 remains a vast array of facts which can become
generally known only through the uniform results of experi-
ence in life. From the immense multiplicity of these matters,
they may never receive, in the usual form, either historical or
scientific endorsement. They lie in the region of traditional
or actual knowledge, common to civilization, and may be known
as "a kncwledge of men and tfiings."' The rule for their judi-
cial reception is, that "courts will not pretend to be more
ignorant that the rest of mankind." Such matters can never
be given in evidence by means of spoken or written language,
and hence, they can leave no impression upon the record of a
cause. They are noticed and considered in the trial of every-
question of fact-; and all courts, especially those of appellate
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jurisdiction, recognize this to be true. They are impressed
upon the attention of trial courts in the hearing of causes, and
it is because they are thus enabled to apply them, in arriving
at the truth from the too often careless, perverse, or corrupt
statements of the witnesses, whether conflicting, contradictory
or false, that these courts are endowed with a supervisory
power, even over the findings of juries, and it is made their
duty to see that the verdict is sufficiently sustained by proper
testimony. It may often occur that this intangible information
will lay bare the motives of men and afford the only correct
interpretation of the peculiar conduct of parties. In this respect,
appellate courts can have no such means of enlightenment as
they readily concede to the courts of first instance, and it is for
this reason that they so reluctantly disturb the findings and
judgments of the latter courts, upon the evidence.
XXXII.
In this connection, a number of decisions are given in which
the courts refused to take judicial notice of matters which were
claimed to be proper subjects therefor.. While, in some in-
stances, it may be somewhat difficult to mark the lines of dis-
tinction, the grounds of rejection will be seen, generally, to rest
on the primary rules governing the subject.
The Supreme Court of California refused to take notice of
the rules established by the Board of Land Commissioners or
Surveyor General of the United States, forbidding original
papers from being taken from the files; and refused to allow
evidence of the contents of such papers, without proof of the
existence of the rule: Hensley v. Tarpey (1857), 7 Cal. 288.
And in New York, where a question in a cause depended on
the construction of several regulations of the Canal Board, the
court refused to take judicial notice of them: Pahnerv.Aldridge
(1852), 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 131. The court cannot take notice of
the rate of interest in another State, from a table of the same
prepared by the Secretary of State and appended to the stat-
utes, as required by.law: Clarke v. Pratt (1852), 2o Ala. 470;
Dorsey v. Dorsey (1831), 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 280. And the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to notice that there are
county judges in New York, or that they have authority to
MATTERS REQUIRING JUDICIAL NOTICE.
administer oaths: Fellows v. Menasha (I86o), I I Wis. 558.
The court cannot take notice that a railroad company has a
seal,.other than a scrawl purporting to be a seal, which appears
on an appeal bond filed by them: Illinois Central R. R. Co. v.
Johnson (1864), 40 Ill. 35. Couits will take judicial notice of
public treaties, and of the authority conferred by them on the
President; but not that such authority to do an act affecting
only a small number of persons, and they not citizens of the
United States, has been exercised: Dole v. W~ilson (1871), 16
Minn. 525. The courts do not take judicial notice of the
various orders issued by a military commander, in the exercise
of the military authority conferred upon him: Burke v. .21ilten-
berger (1873), 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 519. Courts cannot take
judicial notice of the duties required of or performed by the
servants of the company, in managing a railroad train, nor of
the degrees of supremacy existing among them: MfcGowan v.
St. Louis, &c., R.R. Co. (1876), 6i Mo. 525. Nor of the duties
of officers of railroad companies: Brown v. Missouri, &c., R.R.
Co. (1877), 67 Mo. 122. It is not the duty of the courts to
take judicial notice of the various means by which public
statutes are carried into effect by the executive officers of the
government: Canal Co. v. Railroad Co. (832), 4 G. & J.
(Md.) I.
Courts cannot judicially know that a sale of land has been
made, because they are bound to know that there is a law pro-
viding for such sale: Bledsoe v. Doe (1839), 4 How. (Miss.) 13,
In Alabama, New Jersey and North Carolina, charters of
private corporations are not judicially noticed: Cit Council of
Montgomery v. Plaiik Road Co. (1857), 31 Ala. 76; Perdicaris
v. -Trenton, &c., Co. (1862), 29 N. J. L. 367; Carrow v. Wvash-
ingpon Toll Bridge (1867), Phil. (N. C.) II8. Notice will
not be taken of special acts of the legislature: Hailes v. State
(I88o), 9 Tex. Ct. App. I7o. The court will not take judicial
notice that a private corporation was organized under a general
law: Crawfordsville, &c., Co. v. Fletcher (1885), io4 Ind. 97.
XXXIII.
The statute'law of Great Britain now in force, or created
since the Revolution, cannot be judicially noticed by our courts,
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except in the same manner as the criminal laws of any other
forei-n state: O,'an Iisit-ance Ca. v. Fields (I841), 2 Story
(U. S. C. Ct., D. Mass.) ;9. In the absence of proof of the for-
eign law, showing a legal liability, a payment of debts by a
stockholder for a foreign corporation will be deemed to have
been a voUntary payment: Eastman v. Crosby (1864), 8 Allen
(Mass.) 206. As our courts do not take judicial notice of for-
eign revenue laws, a note not stamped in accordance with the
laws of the country where made, will be held valid here: Did-
low v. I -n Rcnssd,'ar (186), I Johns. (N. Y.) 94.
Giving operation to a foreign law rests in mere comity, and
no court will take cognizance of a matter concerning the in-
ternal policy of another State; therefore, courts will not sustain
an action on a foreign contract, where none would lie by the
law of the former: Rickerin-gv. Fisk (1834), 6 Vt. 102. And
the Supreme Court of Michigan will not recognize the value
of Canada currency, nor the rate of interest in Canada: Kermott
v. Aycr (1 863), I1 Mich. 181 .
XXXIV.
The rule that courts will presume the common law to be in
force in other States, is not followed in Texas, where the
Supreme Court has refused to take such notice: Biradshaa' v.
Jfayfel/d(I856), 18 Tex. 21. The Nw York courts will not
take judicial notice that the law of any other State differs from
their own: A' Yoark Phza'lir Ins. Co. v. Church (188o), 59
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 293. In Illinois, in an action of assumpsit,
evidence of the statute incorporating the Chamber of Com-
merce of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with certain proceedings of
the board of arbitrators, was held inadmissible: Klddetrhouse v.
Saveland (1877), I Bradw. (Ill.) 6-.
Courts will not take judicial notice of local customs, such as
the taking of one-third of the land by the locator for his ser-
vices: Long'es v. Kennedy (1812), 2 3ibb (Ky.) 607. Nor what
are fair and usual commissions on acceptances, paid without
funds: Stymnon- v..barvin (85I), I Barb. (N. Y.) SO. Nor
of the customs of a particular trade or calling, as the meaning
of printers' marks or abbreviations, showing the date and
number of insertions of matter in a newspaper: Johnson v.
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Robertson (1869), 31 Md. 476. Nor the rule for the measure-
ment of corn in the shock; nor whether a railroad car of given
dimensions will not contain three hundred bushels thereof:
S. & N. A. R. R. Co. v. Wood (1883), 74 Ala. 449. Nor that
playing "policy" is playing a game of chance: State v. Russell
(I885), 17 Mo. App. 16; State v. Selncr (1885), Id. 39.
Nor that the words "drawing" and "Kentucky drawing,"
designate a game of chance: State v. Briner(I885), Id. 274.
XXXV.
The Supreme Court of Indiana cannot judicially know the
names of towns and cities that have adopted the general incor-
poration law: Johnson v. Common Council (I86), 16 Ind. 227.
Courts cannot take -notice of the width of streets and'side-
walks in a city, when the same is established by ordinance:
Porterv. Waring(I877), 69 N.Y. 25o. Nor of the intersection
of a street in a city with a railroad track: Pennsylvania R. R.
Co. v. Frana (1883), 13 Bradw. (Il.) 91. Nor that a county has
adopted township organization: State v. Cleveland (1883), 80
Mo. io8. Where every community of two hundred inhabi-
tants may incorporate itself into a town, the courts will not
take judicial notice of such incorporation: Tli'ple v. State
(1883), 15 Tex. Ct. App. 304.
Where, in an instrument of conveyance of land, the name of
a place is given, but not of the State where the same was made,
courts will take notice of a place of the same name within the
Stafe and presume it to have b en intended: Richardson v.
Williams (1835), 2 Por. (Ala.) 239. The courts of Indiana
will not take judicial notice of the division of counties and the
erection of new ones by county conmissioners: Buckingiouse
v. Gregg (1862), 19 Ind. 4O. Nor will courts notice the local
situations of towns within a county, or their distances from
each other: Goo;dwin v. Apleton (1843), 22 Me. 453. It has
been held by the Supreme Courts of Missouri, Wisconsin and
Texas, upon what ground does not clearly appear, that they
could not take judicial notice of prominent cities in other
States, as New York, New Orleans, &c.: Riggin v. Collier
(184o), 6 Mo. 568; Wttlocik v. Castro (1&58), .22 Tex. lO8;
Woodward v. Chicago, &c., R. R. Co. (1867), 21 Wis. 3o9. The
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Supreme Court of Indiana will not notice the existence of fer-
ries, as they are established by the county commissioners:
State -. 1J se ([856), 7 Ind. 645. In Ohio, courts will not
notice the subdivision of the refugee township; although the
court will take notice, from the description, that the township
is a fractional one: Stanberry v. Nlson (834), Wright (Ohio)
766. The Supreme Court of Texas refused to notice that,
"St. Louis, \Io.," means St. Louis in the State of Missouri;
the same appearing in the date of a contract: Ellis v. Park
(1852), 8 Tex. 205 ; and the same court refused notice that a
note made payable in "New Orleans, La.," was meant to be
payable in the State of Louisiana: Russell v. 3artin (i85 5),
15 Tex. 238. It has been held that, while courts will take
notice of the distances between well-known geographical points
in the United States, they cannot take such notice of what
would be a reasonable time for an express company to carry
a sum of money from one to the other: Rice v.' fontgomeiy
(1866), 4 Biss. (U.S. C. Ct., D. Ind.) 75- On the other hand, it
is held, with much more satisfaction, in Pennsylvania, that the
ordinary speed of railway trains is a matter for judicial cogni-
zance, and hence a very simple calculation will demonstrate,
with approximate certainty, the time within which mails may
be transported between such cities as New York and Pitts-
burgh: Pearce v. Langfl/ (1882), IOI Pa. 507. Notice will be
taken of the usual duration of voyages across the Atlantic; so
far, at least, is to determine when the presumption of death
attaches to one who -wvas known to have embarked on a vessel
that has never been heard of after a great lapse of time: Op-
penlii v. Wolf (1846), 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 571. Judicial
notice will not be taken of the locality of the office of a justice
of the peace; nor that a particular number of a certain street
is in a given ward or district of a city: Allen v. Sckzarrnighausen
(i88o, 8 Mo. App. 229. Nor that certain land is not subject
to location, because it lies under a navigable lake: Wilcox v.
Jackson ([1883), 109 Ill. 261.
XXXVI.
Facts of history must be well authenticated or universally
known, to receive judicial notice. The Supreme Court of
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Tennessee refused to take notice of the extent of military occu-
pation of the State by the forces of either side, during the civil
war, relating to the time when such occupation was still being
contested; on the ground that those matters were of too
uncertain character to be regarded as having passed into his-
tory; and as still being readily susceptible of proof: JleDonzald
v. Kirby (1 87 I), 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 607. The same court refused
to take cognizance of the positions of the armies in the field,
at any particular period of the war: Kuley v. Stor (1871), 6
Id. 202.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in a decision which seems to
have been much misunderstood by writers on this subject,
held, that the trial court, on the 16th day of April, 186I, could
not take judicial notice, from the newspaper reports of the
firing on Fort Sumter, on the I2th of the same month, that
civil war existed, in the absence of any official declaration to
that effect, by either the United States or Confederate author-
ities: Bishop v. Joncs (1866), 28 Tex. 294.
The courts in New York hold that judicial notice will be
taken of matters of general history or universal notoriety, if
they are of a general and public nature, but not where they
merely concern individuals or local communities: JhlcKinnon
v. Bliss (I86o), 21 N. Y. 206. Facts stated in encyclopedias,
dictionaries, or other publications, will not be judicially no-
ticed, unless they are of such universal notoriety as to be
regarded as forming a portion of the common knowledge of
every person: Kaolatipe Eiigraz'ing Co. v. Hoke (U. S. C. Ct.
E. D. Mo., 1887), 30 Fed. Repr. 444. Courts cannot take judi-
cial notice of geographical and similar facts, not historical or
traditional, as the capacity of a small stream for navigable or
other purposes: Buffalo Pipe Lim" Co. v. New Irk, Lake Eric,
&c.,R. R. Co. (I88o), Io Abb. New Cas. (N.Y.), io 7 . Nor of
the extent of the depreciation of the currency, during the war
period: M"1oda-well v. Holmes (1867), 4o Ala. 391. Nor, that
during certain seasons of the year. Texas cattle are liable to
produce disease: Brafor1 v. Foyd (1883), ,So Me,. r . At
the present time, the germ of the Texas cattle f._-2'r h:s been
discovered, and identified, by Billings and others, and the fact
that those cattle do communicate disease is establi.-shed; and
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it would seem now to be only a question of sufficient notoriety
for courts to recognize such facts in regard to it.
Courts do not take notice of the marktt value of lead ore:
Cook v. Decker (1876), 63 Mo. 328. Nor of the usages and
customs of mining districts: Sulivan v. Hense (1874), 2 Colo.
424. Nor that concentric circles or layers in the trunk
of a tree, each mark a year's growth : Patteirson v. M1!cCaus-
/and (1830), 3 Bland (Md.) 69. Nor that kerosene oil is a re-
fined coal oil, or a refined earth oil: Beniet v. Nortlh British
ns. Co. (I879), 8 Daly (N. Y.) 471.
XXXVII.
In a criminal cause, where the person who was prosecuting
attorney, when the indictment was found, has come upon the
bench when the case was tried, the court does not judicially
know that the prosecuting attorney and presiding judge is the
same person: Shropshiev. State (185 i), 12 Ark. 19o. In Texas,
notice will not be taken of any officer, unless enumerated in
the code: AlfA'rd v. State (i 88o), 8 Tex. Ct. App. 545. Courts
will not take judicial notice of the official character of a dep-
uty marshal: Jlinl v. IfAny (1865), 19 Wis. 76; Pottcr v.
Lu/ito- (Iqo,), 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 431. Where constables are ap-
pointed by the town authorities, their official character will not
be presumed by the courts : Prong/d11on v. Blackman (1797), 1
D. Chip. (Vt.) io9.
The jury cannot take judicial notice of the facts of history,
but some proof thereof must be given ; therefore, on an ap-
peal fiom a non-suit, the appellate court cannot take notice of
historical fiacts not put in evidence before the jury: JfcKin-
non v. Bliss (i 86-A, 21 N. Y. 2o6. In an action against an
insurance company to recover for a loss by fire, the court
cannot take judicial notice that gin and turpentine are inflam-
mable liquids, within the meaning of that term as used in a
clause providing that the policy shall be void, etc.: 3Iosey v.
Vermont _/n/itrl Fire Ins. Co. (1882), 55 Vt. 142. The court
cannot judicially know whether or not there are legitimate
modes of expending money in procuring the passage of an act
of the legislature; and, therefore, it cannot say that an aver-
ment, in an answer, of such expenditure with such purpose
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and result, is either immaterial or vicious: Judal v. Trustees,
&c. (I86t), 16 Ind. 56. Where two corporations each com-
mence proceedings against the same person in the same court,
for the condemnation of the same lands, the court cannot, of
its own motion, in one action, take judicial notice of the pen-
dency of the other, and refuse to take any action in the matter,
on the ground of the pendency of the other action: Lake
Merced WVater Co. v. Cowles (1866), 31 Cal. 215. Neither the
Supreme, nor the District Court, of a State, will take judicial
notice of proceedings pending in the Federal courts for confir-
mation of a Pueblo title, unless it is stated in the pleadings:
Vassault v. Seitz (i866), Id. 225. In the trial of a case,
the court cannot take cognizance of the record of another case
in the same court, unless it is introduced in evidence; much
less can it take such notice of a case in a different court:
Peoplev. De La Guerra (1864), 24 Cal. 73. A court cannot
take judicial notice that an affidavit of a party had been ad-
mitted in another cause, to which he was not a party; nor can
it be admitted in evidence upon the ground that the court re-
members that it was in that case stated by the court that it
would be evidence in the case at bar: Bakery. Mfyatt (1862),
14 Iowa 13I. Nor can a judge sitting in one county take no-
tice of a conviction or no. pros., previously had before him- in
another county: State v. Edwards (1854), 19 Mo. 674. And
an appellate court cannot become.cognizant of the value of an
attorney's services in a cause, by looking at his argument, as
shown in the printed reports: Pearson v. Darrington (1858),
32 Ala. 227. An act which requires the courts of the county
in which the articles of association are recorded, to take judi-
cial notice of the existence of corporations thus formed, does
not require the Supreme Court to take such notice: Cicero,
&c., Co. v. Craighead (1867), 28 Ind. 274. And the value of
the notes of a certain bank, at any particular time, will not be
judicially noticed: Feemster v. Ringo (1827), 5 T. B. Mon.
(Ky.) 336. Nor can the Supreme Court take judicial notice
of the rules of the District Courts, unless they are incorpo-
rated in the record: Cutter v. Caruthers (1874), 48 Cal. 178.
In the absence of evidence to that effect, the Supreme Court
cannot take notice that a case before the Court is connected
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with one previously decided by it: Banks v. Burnam (1875),
61 Mo. 76.
Courts will not take notice of military orders extending the
time for a stay of execution on judgments: Johnson v. Wilsor
(1877), 29 Grat. (Va.) 379. A State court is not required to
notice judicially, that proceedings in bankruptcy have been
instituted by or against parties to a suit pending therein:
.Elsterbrook Aff'g Co. v. Ahern (1879), 3o N. J. Eq. 341. Nor
can the courts in Minnesota take notice of the proper orthog-
raphy or pronunciation of the Polish language: State v.John-
son (1879), 26 Minn. 316. Nor that a bank in another State
is in an insolvent condition: Market Bank v. Pacific Bank
(1882), 27 Hun (N. Y.) 465. The court cannot take official
cognizance that an election has been held, as provided byz
local option law, or of its result: Grider v. Talley (I884), 72
Ala. 422. And where, in an action for slander, the defence
was, that the crime charged was a physical impossibility, the
court could not take judicial knowledge of this fact for the
want of sufficient information in regard to it, but held, that, if
it were so impossible, this fact was not generally known to the
people, who, though bound to know the law, are not required
to be acquainted with philosophic or scientific facts and princi-
ples; therefore, the injury to the plaintiff might not be affected
by the truth or falsity of those facts and principles, and that
the action might well lie: Ausmnan v. T'al (1858), IO Ind. 355.
While it is evident that a due administration of justice will
not be enhanced by an enlargement of the grounds upon
which courts take judicial notice of facts, it is equally clear
that our system of jurisprudence must not be allowed to fall
behind the rapid advancement of general knowledge. Through
discoveries, and the application of new methods to the forces
of nature, many results are constantly being developed, which,
in some instances, produce complete changes in commercial,
scientific, and even social affairs. It becomes, then, a question
for the courts to determine, when such matters have attained
sufficient notoriety, by becoming incorporated into daily life,
to entitle them to judicial notice.
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